Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate Advocacy
Volume 11

Issue 1

Article 9

1-1-2006

Construction Defect Litigation: Courts' Fragmented Rationales
regarding Coverage for Contractor's Faulty Workmanship
Lisa C. Friedlander
Suffolk University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.suffolk.edu/jtaa-suffolk
Part of the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
11 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 119 (2006)

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Collections @ Suffolk. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate Advocacy by an authorized editor of Digital Collections @ Suffolk.
For more information, please contact dct@suffolk.edu.

CONSTRUCTION DEFECT LITIGATION: COURTS'
FRAGMENTED RATIONALES REGARDING COVERAGE

FOR CONTRACTOR'S FAULTY WORKMANSHIP
In Boston, Massachusetts, the Central Artery Tunnel Project, also
known as the "Big Dig," is considered an engineering marvel. Designers
and contractors encountered many challenges including adverse soil conditions, confined work spaces, andproximity to office towers and historical
buildings, while trying to construct an underground expressway beneath
an elevated highway. After fourteen years of construction, an estimated
cost of 14.6 billion dollars, and hundreds of leaks in the tunnel walls, accusations of construction defects naturally arose. Construction defect
claims are no stranger to public construction contracts. Different courts
andjurisdictionshave taken varied approaches regardingfaulty workmanship coverage under a Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policy.'
The Big Dig contractors and subcontractors should be concerned with
their potential liability under a CGL policy because courts have failed to
supply a universal interpretationof liability under these policies. How can
they truly understand what their CGL policy coverage encompasses when
widespread disagreementexists among the courts?

I. INTRODUCTION
Some contractors confronted with a claim of faulty workmanship by
their customers are shocked to discover that there is no coverage for faulty

1 Southwest Metalsmiths, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 85 F.App'x 552, 554
(9th Cir. 2004) (noting at least four possible interpretations of an "occurrence" under a
Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policy). After a review of case law from numerous
jurisdictions, the court in Southwest Metalsmiths stated:
There are, at the very least, four possible interpretations of the term "occurrence"
under a CGL policy: (1) accidents that include the faulty work of the insured as
long as the work causes some collateral damage to tangible property; (2) accidents that include the faulty work of the insured in the form of faulty installation
standing alone; (3) accidents that include the faulty work of the subcontractor that
are unforeseen; and (4) accidents that do not include faulty workmanship by the
subcontractor.
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workmanship under their CGL policy. 2 Such a discovery leaves many
experienced builders wondering why they even purchased the insurance
policy. 3 How can a contractor understand what the limits of his coverage
are under his
4 CGL policy when there is widespread disagreement among
the courts?
Insurance coverage disputes regarding construction defects are a
rapidly growing area of controversy in the insurance industry. 5 Courts
have interpreted policy coverage language differently; therefore, parties
often attempt to present precedent from other jurisdictions that support
their position.6 Consequently, this has resulted in additional litigation.7
Over the past fifteen years, litigation involving defects in construction has exploded.8 The enormous cost of this litigation has impacted
homeowners, contractors, insurance companies and state legislatures,
among others. 9 Accordingly, inferior quality construction resulted in a
financial burden on society, as well as complex and expensive insurance
coverage litigation. 10
A Commercial General Liability policy covers the liability exposures of a business that are not specifically excluded under that policy."
The range of coverage encompasses product liability, completed opera-

2 See Randy J. Maniloff, Construction Defect Coverage in Flux: No Hope for Bob
the Builder - Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions and Three Different Approaches Has Kvaerner's Foundation Been Cracked?, 18-43 MEALEY'S LiTIG. REP. INS. 17 (2004)
(describing builders surprise regarding the limits of coverage under their CGL policy).
3 See id. at 17 (discussing builders confusion and surprise regarding the extent of
coverage under their CGL policy).
4 See id. (noting disagreement exists among courts resulting in contractors confusion
regarding construction defect coverage). Compare American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
American Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 2004), with Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Home Pride
Companies, Inc., 684 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 2004), and L-J Inc. v. Bituminous Fire and Marine
Ins. Co., 621 S.E.2d 33 (S.C. 2005). See also infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text
(discussing three courts' varied reasoning in reaching same conclusion).
5 See Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing increase of construction defect
claims).
6 See id. (discussing courts' differing interpretation of policy language results in
further litigation).
7 See id. (recognizing growth of construction defect litigation).
8 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Injury to Building Caused by Negligent Soil Analysis May
Constitute Occurrence under CGL that is Not Precluded by Business Risk Exclusions or
Similar Limitations on Coverage; Recent Court Decisions, 71 J. RISK & INS. No. 2, at 334
(2004) (noting recent boom of construction defect litigation).
9 Id. (acknowledging increase of construction defect litigation's effects on many
parties).
10 See id. (discussing construction defect litigation's societal costs).

1 Insurance

Information

Institute,

Glossary

of

Insurance

Terms,

http://www.iii.org/media/glossary/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (stating industry definition
of CGL insurance).
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tions, premises and operations, and independent contractors. 2 Disagreement exists, however, among lawyers, policyholders and courts regarding
the extent
of insurance coverage available to contractors under a CGL pol3
icy.

1

A central question in the disagreement regarding coverage is
whether a construction defect is considered "property damage" and an "occurrence," as defined in a CGL policy, terms essential to the trigger of policy coverage. 14 The CGL policy defines "occurrence," a condition precedent of policy coverage, as "an accident," and the definition of "occurrence" includes "property damage" which is not expected or intended by
the insured. 5
This note will explore construction defect cases, specifically examining three recent state supreme court decisions that demonstrate jurisdictions' various rationales regarding CGL coverage.16 Part II will provide a
brief overview of the relevant history of Commercial General Liability

2 Allen

Financial

Insurance

Group,

Insurance

Definitions,

at

http://www.eqgroup.comlinsurancedefinitions.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2005) (outlining
coverage areas of CGL insurance). Commercial General Liability can be written as a
monoline policy or as part of a commercial package. Id. "CGL" means the "commercial
general liability forms which have replaced the earlier 'comprehensive' general liability
forms." Id. The CGL form provides broad coverage and is available in two variations,
"occurrence," and "claims made" coverage. Id.
13 See Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17 (acknowledging construction defect claim controversies are common). As a result of increased court decisions on the topic of faulty
work, there has been increased disagreement over what is and what is not covered on an
insurance policy. Id.
14 See, e.g., American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 673 N.W.2d 65; Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,
684 N.W.2d 571; L- Inc., 621 S.E.2d 33 (examining whether construction defect constitutes an "occurrence" under CGL policy). See also Alison Hightower & Katrina J. Lee, So
How Do You Define "Accident"?, IN THE LAW, Vol. 01, No. 5 at 151 (discussing "accident" not defined in insurance policies). Insurance policies typically:
restrict coverage to 'damages caused by an occurrence neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.' 'Occurrence' in turn is defined as 'an
accident,' though accident is not defined. The rationale for limiting coverage to
'accidents' is that insurance should cover negligence, but not intentional misconduct.

Id.
15 MATrHEW BENDER & Co., INC., 1-1 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 1.15 (2d ed. 2005)
(discussing casualty insurance and risk transfer generally). "Property damage" is defined as
"physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property...[and] loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured." Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Miller Bldg. Corp., 97 F.App'x 431, 434 (4th Cir. 2004) (summarizing
definition of "property damage").
16 See American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 673 N.W.2d 65; Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 684
N.W.2d 571; L-J Inc., 621 S.E.2d 33; see also infra notes 50-95 and accompanying text
(examining three recent decisions involving construction defect litigation).
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insurance and the CGL policy.' 7 Part III will focus on three recent state
supreme court decisions involving construction defect actions in Wisconsin, South Carolina and Nebraska which examined the meaning of an "occurrence." 1 8 Part IV will compare the court's differing approaches in
reaching their conclusions, particularly involving exceptions and exclusions in the CGL policy. 19 Part V will conclude that it is time for the
United States Supreme Court to decide the relevant standard to be applied
in construction defect litigation cases. 2°
II. HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE "CGL" POLICY
WITH RESPECT TO CONSTRUCTION DEFECT CLAIMS
In general, liability insurance is commonly referred to as third-party
insurance because the insurer, on the insured's behalf, is obligated to pay
directly a third-party claimant who is injured by conduct of the insured. 2'
Accordingly, the insurer's duty to pay does not run directly to the insured.22 Fundamentally, the insurer indemnifies its insured for any liability
the insured may have to the injured party by reimbursing the injured party
on behalf of the insured.2 3 Determining whether or not coverage exists
under the CGL policy involves a two-step process: first, the insured must
show that the policy covers his loss; second, in order to avoid coverage, the
insurer
must show specific policy language that excludes the insured's
24
lOSS.

The purpose of a general liability policy is to safeguard the insured
from liability for personal injury or property damage to a third party that
17 See infra notes 21-49 and accompanying text (discussing GCL insurance and pol-

icy generally).
18See infra notes 50-95 and accompanying text (examining three recent decisions
involving construction defect litigation). In examining what constitutes an "occurrence,"
three recent state supreme court decisions have utilized three separate approaches to arrive
at two different conclusions. See supra note 2, at 17.
19 See infra notes 96-119 and accompanying text (comparing three recent state supreme court decisions involving construction defect litigation).
20 See infra notes 120-121 and accompanying text (considering future of construction
defect litigation).
21 MATTHEW BENDER & CO., INC., APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 3.3 (2d ed. 2004)
(describing third-party indemnity insurance generally).
22 Id. (describing insurer's duty to pay does not run directly to insured).
23 See id. (comparing insured's "indirect" loss and third party's "direct" loss). The
insured party acts as a channel for the transfer of insurance proceeds from the liability insurer to the injured third party. Id. Using the "Big Dig" as an illustrative example, suppose
a nearby office tower was damaged due to the negligence of a contractor, during the excavation of soil adjacent to the tower. The owner of the office tower sued the contractor, who
purchased CGL insurance. In this scenario, the contractor's insurer would potentially reimburse the injured party on behalf of the contractor, the insured.
24 McDonald v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 837 P.2d 1000, 1003-04 (Wash. 1992)
(setting forth two-step process for determining existence of coverage).
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could be caused by the insured's products or services. 25 A common misconception, especially among those with insurance coverage, is that the
purpose of liability insurance is to provide for the repair or replacement of
the insured's poorly constructed product, or to perform the service correctly.26 Coverage is excluded in these circumstances because a contractor
or subcontractor would receive duplicate payment. 27 These duplicate payments would include a payment from the customer to a contractor for work
completed, and another payment from the insurance company to repair or
replace the deficiencies in its poorly constructed product. 28 Another policy
reason that liability insurance is not for the repair or replacement of a
faulty product or service is that the responsibility and obligation of the
contractor or subcontractor to perform the project in a workmanlike fashion would be diminished. 29 Essentially, the contractor or subcontractor's
incentive to provide a quality product would be eliminated.30
Furthermore, liability coverage is "not a replacement for a warranty
3
or a guaranty of the performance to be given to the insured's customer.", 1
25

See id. (describing liability insurance policy's intent); see also Hobson Constr. Co.

v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 322 S.E.2d 632, 635 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (stating definition of
property damage in a typical CGL policy). In a typical CGL policy, property damage is
defined as:
(1) Physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs during the
policy period, including the loss of use thereof at any time resulting therefrom, or
(2) Loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or destroyed provided such loss of use is caused by an occurrence during the policy period.
Hobson Constr. Co., 322 S.E.2d at 635 (citation omitted).
26 See MATrHEW BENDER & CO., INC., supra note 21 (discussing purpose of liability
policies generally); see also Centex Homes Corp. v. Prestressed Sys., Inc., 444 So.2d 66, 67
(Fla. 1984) (emphasizing scope of purpose of liability insurance). The Florida Supreme
Court pointed out the deeply rooted principal that the purpose of liability insurance is to
"provide protection for personal injury or property damage caused by the product only and
not for the replacement or repair of the product." Centex Homes Corp., 444 So.2d at 67.
27 Centex Homes Corp., 444 So.2d at 67 (noting policy reasons for purpose of liability insurance not for repair or replacement); see also LaMarche v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 390
So. 2d 325, 326 (Fla. 1980) (finding duplicate payment to contractors not intent of parties or
policy language).
28 Centex Homes Corp., 444 So.2d at 67 (outlining duplicate payments to contractors
if policy for repair or replacement).
29 See Centex Homes Corp., 444 So.2d at 67-68 (noting existence of insurance for
repair or replacement would eliminate obligation to initially perform in workmanlike manner).
30 See id. (pointing to consequence of elimination of obligation and incentive to perform in a workmanlike manner and produce a quality product).
"' See MATFHEw BENDER & Co., INC., supra note 21 (noting liability insurance not the
same as a warranty or performance guaranty); see also Travelers Indemnity Co., 97
F.App'x. at 434 (stressing liability insurance policies do not intend to act as a performance
bond). Travelers insurance policy provided coverage for "those sums that the insured be-
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For example, in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Miller Building Corp.32 , the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
building owner's claim against the builder for recovery for the cost to correct the builder's faulty workmanship was not within the scope of the insurance policy because faulty workmanship is not considered "property
damage. 3 3 To be considered "property damage," the property must have
been undamaged previously.34 Comparatively, defective construction was
never undamaged.3 5
Coverage disputes involving construction defects are often further
complicated because some contractors do not have a full understanding of
the coverage of a CGL policy. 36 In general, CGL insurance includes coverage for "damage caused by a contractors faulty work," not for the expense for repair or replacement of the actual faulty work. 37 That the CGL
policy does not cover the repair or replacement of faulty work often is surprising to contractors as these costs are often the most significant exposures and expenses at issue in construction disputes.38
In the United States, CGL insurance policies traditionally are "occurrence" based, as opposed to other liability policies, such as Directors
and Officers and Professional Liability, which are "claims-made".39
comes legally obligated to pay as damages because of. . . 'property damage,"' so long as
the "'property damage' is caused by an 'occurrence."' Travelers Indemnity Co., 97
F.App'x. at 434. In particular, discussing the "work product" exclusion in CGL policies:
Since the quality of the insured's work is a 'business risk' which is solely within
his own control, liability insurance generally does not provide coverage for claims
arising out of the failure of the insured's product or work to meet the quality or
specifications for which the insured may be liable as a matter of contract.
Western World Ins. Co. v. Carrington, 369 S.E.2d 128, 130 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing "work product" exclusion in standard CGL policies).
32 Travelers Indemnity Co., 97 F.App'x. at 434.
33 Id. (stressing intent of liability insurance policies not to act as a performance bond).
34 Id. at 433 (establishing property damage definition involves property previously
undamaged). See supra note 15 and accompanying text (stating definition of "property
damage").
5 Travelers Indemnity Co., 97 F.App'x. at 433 (explaining defective construction
never undamaged). The Travelers court concluded, however, that damage to separate tangible property, such as carpet, caused by the defective construction of windows and doors,
does fall within the CGL policies definition of "property damage". Id. at 434.
36 RANDY MANILOFF, Insurance Coverage: Hot Topics, Morgan Stanley, Insurance Property & Casualty, Sept. 9, 2004, at 6 (discussing growth trend of construction defect
litigation).
37 Id. (noting purpose for CGL coverage).
38 Id. (acknowledging contractors surprise that CGL policies do not cover repair or
replacement of faulty work).
39 MATrHEW BENDER & CO., INC., supra note 21 (comparing "occurrence" versus
"claims-made" triggers of coverage). See also supra note 12 and accompanying text (naming two variations of CGL coverage); Tracy Alan Saxe, What Every Lawyer, Risk Manager
Should Know About Coverage, CONN. LAW TRm., April 19, 2004, at 5 (clarifying "occur-
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Through the "occurrence" based CGL policy, the insurer is obligated to
pay or defend claims, whenever they are made, resulting from an incident
that occurred during the policy time period. 40 The insurer is obliged to
defend and indemnify claims if an "occurrence" based liability policy was
in force when the alleged bodily injury or property damage occurred.4'
The CGL insurer has two major duties to the insured, the duty to indemnify for settlements and judgments within the coverage granted, and
the duty to provide defense for the policyholder.42 In every state, insurers
have a duty to provide defense if the complaint against the insured even
suggests facts which could potentially bring the claim within the policy's
coverage grant. 43 All claims or suits alleging that the insured caused property damage or bodily injury, even those encompassing certain intentional
acts, lead to the possibility that the insurer will incur defense costs. 44 The
duty to defend feature of the CGL policy is exceptionally significant to
policyholders challenged with circumstances such as "product liability
[including asbestos], environmental, construction defects, intellectual prop-

rence" versus "claims-made" liability policy differences). A "claims-made" policy "pays
claims presented to the insurer during the term of the policy or within a specific term after
its expiration," limiting insurers' exposure to unknown future liabilities. Insurance Information Institute, Glossary of Insurance Terms, http://www.iii.org/media/glossary/ (last
visited Nov. 20, 2005). In contrast, an "occurrence" policy "pays claims arising out of
incidents that occur during the policy term, even if they are filed many years later." Id.
40 Hartford v. Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 771 (1993) (discussing particular insurers preference for "claims-made" trigger versus traditional "occurrence" trigger"). Despite the standard comprehensive general liability "occurrence" based policy,
industry changes denote a recent increase in the utilization of "claims-made" policies. Id.
In contrast to the "occurrence" trigger, the "claims-made" trigger requires the insurer to pay
or defend only claims made during the policy period. MATrHEW BENDER & Co., INC., supra
note 21; see Saxe, supra note 39, at 5 (clarifying "occurrence" versus "claims-made" liability policy differences).
41 See Saxe, supra note 39, at 5 (discussing insurers obligation to defend and indemnify). Although there are applicable statute of limitations varying from two to six years for
many claims, significant exposure claims such as construction defects could have a very
long tail. See id.
42 See Saxe, supra note 39, at 5 (maintaining duty to defend has an extremely broad
trigger).
43 Id. (describing insurers' duty to defend policyholder); see also Travelers Indemnity
Co., 97 F.App'x. at 433 (elaborating on insurer's duty to defend under North Carolina law);
Waste Mgmt. of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 377 (N.C. 1986) (noting insurer's duty to defend insured generally broader than its obligation to pay damages);
Duke Univ. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 386 S.E.2d 762, 764 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990)
(asserting plaintiff not required to establish ultimate liability, rather only to show facts of
claim within coverage of policy). The insurance companies' duty to provide defense for the
insured does not turn on the companies' eventual liability to pay. See Saxe, supra note 39,
at 5 (describing insurer's duty to defend).
44 See Saxe, supra note 39, at 5 (proscribing CGL policy is litigation insurance).
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erty or any other potentially covered
claim" where defense costs may con45
siderably exceed policy limits.
Although coverage is generally narrow, construction defect claims
are a financial drain on insurers.46 Construction defect claims are particularly costly because of CGL coverage's broad "duty to defend" the insured,
and because litigation typically involves multiple parties.47 To avoid these
enormous defense costs and waste of financial resources, insurance companies often contribute to settlements regardless of whether their insured is
actually liable or whether the policy clearly provides coverage.48 In the
examination of construction defect controversies, most not resolved
through settlement, it is evident that complex and expensive insurance
coverage litigation impacts multiple stakeholders, including policyholders,
insurers, lawyers, the court system and society.4 9
III. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING
CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS
Since 2004, the supreme courts of Wisconsin, Nebraska, and South
Carolina have each addressed questions of coverage under a CGL policy
regarding claims of faulty workmanship. 0
A. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Girl, Inc.
51
In American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Girl, Inc.,
a soil engineering subcontractor provided faulty advice to a general con52
tractor regarding site-preparation in the construction of a warehouse.
This error resulted in extreme soil settlement and a sinking foundation,
causing the structure to crack and cave-in, and the warehouse to ultimately

45 Saxe, supra note 39, at 5 (noting duty to pay costs of defense usually unlimited as
long as limit not exhausted towards settlement or judgment).
46 MANILOFF, supra note 36, at 6 (noting major expense of construction defect litiga-

tion).

47 MANILOFF, supra note 36, at 6 (discussing broad duty to defend insured exacer-

bates litigation costs). For example, defense costs quickly multiply if a general contractor,
who is sued by a homeowner, then brings in to the lawsuit all the subcontractors involved in
the construction. Id.
48 See MANILOFF, supra note 36, at 6 (recognizing plaintiffs, judges and mediators
often leverage potential of sizeable defense costs by pressuring insurance companies to
contribute to settlements even when questionable liability or coverage).
49 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text (noting financial burden of construction defect litigation impacts multiple parties).
50 See generally, American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 673 N.W.2d 65; Auto-Owners Ins.
Co., 684 N.W.2d 571; L-J Inc., 621 S.E.2d 33 (examining whether construction defect
constitutes an "occurrence" under CGL policy).
"' 673 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 2004).
52 Id. at 69 (describing faulty construction circumstances of warehouse structure).
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be demolished.53 As the general contractor was potentially liable to the
owner of the warehouse under 54certain contractual warranties, it notified its
insurance company of the loss.

The dispute between the defendants, contractor and the building
owner, and the plaintiff insurer, was whether the particular construction
defect claim was for "property damage" caused by an "occurrence" within
the standard CGL insurance policy's grant of coverage.55 In early 2004,
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin concluded that the sinking, buckling and
cracking of the warehouse satisfied the definition of "property damage.' 56
Further, in holding that the "property damage" was caused by an "occurrence" as defined in the CGL policy which triggers coverage, the court
recognized that the damage was not intentional or expected, but rather accidental.57
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin concluded that breach of contract
liability is not unequivocally excluded, reversing the court of appeals decision that the CGL policy's "contractual liability" exclusion excluded coverage.58 The court held that in this particular instance, the "contractual
liability" exclusion did not apply because there was no hold harmless or
indemnification agreement involved. 59 Although the CGL policy does not
commonly cover contract claims arising out of the insured's defective
work or product, the court noted that the absence of coverage is a result of
the business risk exclusion, also known as the "your work" exclusion, not
because a breach of contract can never constitute an "occurrence. 6 °
53 Id. (describing consequences of faulty construction resulted in demolition of ware-

house structure).
54 Id. at 70 (explaining general contractors' notification of warehouse loss to its liability insurer).
55 Id. at 69-70 (addressing issues including meaning of "property damage" and "occurrence").
56 American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 673 N.W.2d at 70 (holding claim within "property
damage" definition of "physical injury to tangible property").
57 Id. at 70 (holding claim within "occurrence" definition). The building damage
caused by settlement of the soil, which was a result of faulty site-preparation advice by the
subcontractor, met the definition of an "occurrence" in the CGL policy, defined as "an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful condition." Id.
58 Id. (explaining "contractual liability" exclusion "excludes coverage for liability that
arises because the insured has contractually assumed the liability of another").
59 Id. (holding "contractual liability" exclusion did not apply because absence of
relevant hold harmless or indemnification agreement).
60 Id. at 76 (explaining CGL policy generally does not provide coverage for construction defect claims as a result of the business risk exclusion). Also known as the "your
work" exclusion, the rationale of the business risk exclusion is commonly explained as
follows:
The insured, as a source of goods or services, may be liable as a matter of contract
law to make good on products or work which is defective or otherwise unsuitable
because it is lacking in some capacity. This may even extend to an obligation to
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The parties did not dispute that the negligent work of the engineering subcontractor caused the soil settlement and resulting property damage
to the building. 6' In examining the CGL policy exclusions, the court recognized the subcontractor exception to the "your work" exclusion.6 2 The
"your work" exclusion in the CGL policy provides specifically:
This insurance does not apply to

. .

. "Property damage" to

"your work" arising out of it or any part of it and included in
the products-completed operations hazard. This exclusion
does not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which
the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor. 653
In summary, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that although
breach of contract is considered an "occurrence" causing "property damage," coverage is excluded by the "your work" exclusion if the property
damage is to the insured's own work. 64 The exclusion, however, does not
apply if the property damage is caused by the work of a subcontractor.65
Other state supreme courts, particularly Nebraska which issued its opinion
later in 2004, have followed differing rationales
regarding the "subcontrac66
tor exception" to the "your work" exclusion."

completely replace or rebuild the deficient product or work. This liability, however, is not what the coverages in questions are designed to protect against. The
coverage is for tort liability for physical damages to others and not for contractual
liability of the insured for economic loss because the product or completed work
is not that for which the damage person bargained.
Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 791 (N.J. 1979) quoting Dean Henderson,
Insurance Protectionfor Products Liability and Completed Operations: What Every Law-

yer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REV. 415, 441 (1971).

American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 673 N.W.2d at 76 (noting fact subcontractors'
negligent work caused soil settlement and resulting building damage).
62 Id. at 82 (recognizing exception to "your work" exclusion in CGL policy).
63 Id. (describing CGL policies "your work" exclusion and subcontractor exception
61

to exclusion). The subcontractor exception was instituted in the 1986 revision of the CGL
policy form. Id. Before 1986, the policy excluded coverage for damage caused to construction projects by subcontractor negligence. Id. See also Kalchthaler v. Keller Constr. Co.,
591 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (stating exception to exclusion restores coverage for damage to completed work caused by subcontractor work).
64 American FamilyMut. Ins. Co., 673 N.W.2d at 82; see also Maniloff, supra note 2,
at 17 (summarizing American Family rule that a breach of contract constitutes an "occurrence" causing "property damage," even to work of insured). The coverage for "property
damage" to the insured's own work, however, is excluded by the "your work" exclusion.
Id. The "your work" exclusion, however, does not apply if the "property damage" is caused
by work of subcontractor's. Id.
65 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (summarizing American Family rule).
66 Compare American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 673 N.W.2d 65 with Auto Owners Ins.
Co., 684 N.W.2d 571.
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B. Auto-Owners Insurance Company v. Home Pride Companies, Inc.
In Auto-Owners Insurance Company v. Home Pride Companies,
Inc.,67 Appletree Apartments, Inc. ("Appletree") contracted with JT Builders, Inc. to install shingles on Appletree's apartment buildings.68 J.T.
Builders, Inc. subcontracted the work to Home Pride Companies, Inc.
("Home Pride"), who then entered into a subcontract with Ron Hansen
Construction to install the shingles. 69 Appletree discovered problems with
the roof and filed suit against Home Pride and other parties, claiming they
failed to "install the shingles in a workmanlike manner and that such faulty
workmanship caused substantial and material damage to the roof structures
and buildings. 70 Home Pride claimed coverage under its CGL policy
from its insurer, Auto-Owners Insurance Company ("Auto-Owners") .71
Auto-Owners brought a declaratory judgment action to determine its obligations to Home Pride.72
The issue on appeal was whether a standard CGL insurance policy
covers an insured contractor for the faulty workmanship of a hired subcontractor.73 The Supreme Court of Nebraska concluded coverage exists,
however, the "subcontractor exception" to the "your work" exclusion was
not the reason for coverage. 74 The Auto-Owners Court stated that the sub67 684 N.W.2d 571 (2004).
68

ship).

Id. (explaining factual background of owner, contractor and subcontractor relation-

69

id.

70

Id. (describing suit against Home Pride as failure to install shingles in workmanlike

fashion leading to structural damage).
71 Id. at 574 (summarizing Home Pride's claim for coverage under its CGL policy).
Auto-Owners claimed the CGL policy did not provide coverage because the faulty workmanship of a subcontractor is not an "occurrence" under the policy. Id. In contrast, Home
Pride insisted coverage existed on the basis of the "subcontractor exception" to the "your
work" exclusion. Id. at 575.
72 Auto Owners Ins. Co., 684 N.W.2d at 574 (noting procedural history of case). The
district court concluded the policy issued to the insured did not cover the insured's claim as
the alleged property damage was not caused by an "occurrence". Id. Summary judgment
was granted in favor of the insurance company. Id.
73 Id. at 575 (addressing issue on appeal of whether contractor is covered under CGL
policy for faulty workmanship of its subcontractor). On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Nebraska, the trial court decision was reversed, and the case was remanded to the district
court for judgment in the contractor's favor. Id. at 580.
" Id. at 575-76 (contending subcontractor exception "merely an exception to an exclusion and, therefore, incapable of providing coverage"); see also Hawkeye Security Ins.
Co. v. Davis, 6 S.W.3d 419, 427 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining exclusion provisions in
an insurance policy); Lassiter Const. v. American States Ins., 699 So.2d 768, 770 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (discussing subcontractor exclusion alone cannot create coverage where no
coverage exists elsewhere on policy). Exclusion provisions that state certain causes of loss
or consequences of a particular insured event are not covered by the insurance policy, do
not grant coverage. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co., 6 S.W.3d at 427. Rather, the exclusion
provision restricts the "obligation of indemnity undertaken by the policy." Id.
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contractor exception within the "your work" exclusion (aka. Exclusion 1)
is not applicable "until two conditions precedent are met: (1) There is an
initial grant of coverage and (2) exclusion "1" operates to preclude coverage.

",75

First addressing whether there was "property damage" caused by an
"occurrence," the court concluded there was "property damage" because
there was physical injury to tangible property.76 Although the court held
that faulty workmanship by itself is not covered under a CGL policy because it is not an accidental event, the court qualified that the damage beyond the contractors own product, which was an unintended and unexpected consequence of the alleged faulty workmanship, is a covered occurrence. 7 7 Applying this rule, the court concluded that the CGL policy provides an initial grant of coverage.78 In considering the policy exclusions,
75Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 684 N.W.2d at 576 (describing conditions precedent for
subcontractor exception to "your work" exclusion to apply); see also L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire and Marine Ins. Co., No. 25854, 2004 S.C. Lexis 190, *1 1-'12 (confirming an
exclusion limits coverage rather than provides coverage); Kalchthaler,591 N.W.2d at 17374 (noting "exclusions can only subtract from coverage").
76 Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 684 N.W.2d at 576 (concluding allegations constituted
"property damage" under CGL policy). Appletree alleged the shingles were breaking and
falling off the roofs, resulting in substantial and material damage to the roof and buildings.
Id. Because these allegations stated a cause for physical injury to tangible property, under
the CGL policy, this constituted "property damage". Id. See also American Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 673 N.W.2d at 70 (holding claim within "property damage" definition of "physical
injury to tangible property"); Kalchthaler, 591 N.W.2d at 173 (concluding water entering
through leaky windows wrecking drapes and walls constitutes "property damage"); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Reeder, 270 Cal. Rptr. 719, 723 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (asserting inferior
materials or worksmanship alone does not constitute "property damage," however resulting
physical injury or lost use of tangible property does).
77Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 684 N.W.2d at 577 (noting coverage exists for consequences of faulty workmanship). The Auto-Owners court summarized "although a standard
CGL policy does not provide coverage for faulty workmanship that damages only the resulting work product, if faulty workmanship causes bodily injury or property damage to
something other than the insured's work product, an unintended and unexpected event has
occurred, and coverage exists." Id. at 578. See also High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co.,
648 A.2d 474, 478 (N.H. 1994) (interpreting "accident" in "occurrence" definition to mean
unexpected and unintended circumstances); L-J, Inc., 567 S.E.2d at 493-94, rev'd, 621
S.E.2d 33 (S.C. 2005) (noting under CGL policy, the "property damage," not the construction activity that caused the property damage, cannot be expected or intended); Radenbaugh
v. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co., 610 N.W.2d 272, 279-80 (Mich. 2001) (indicating "accident"
exists within meaning of CGL policy when insured's defective workmanship results in
damage to property of others); Kalchthaler,591 N.W.2d at 173-74 (concluding water entering through leaky windows wrecking drapes and walls constitutes "property damage").
78 Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 684 N.W.2d at 578-79 (noting underlying complaint alleged
contractors negligently installed shingles, causing shingles to fall off). The further allegation that the faulty workmanship caused the roofs and buildings to sustain significant damage, is an "unintended and unexpected consequence of the contractors' faulty workmanship
and goes beyond damages to the contractors' own work product." Id. Therefore, the court
concluded the complaint alleged an "occurrence" within the meaning of the CGL policy.
Id. at 579.
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the court held that the "your work" exclusion was not applicable because
the damages alleged were beyond the cost of basic repair and replacement
of the contractors' work. 7 9 The court concluded that Auto-Owners had a
duty to defend Home Pride and an obligation to provide coverage to the
extent Home Pride was liable for the resulting damage to the roofs and
buildings. 80 The Supreme Court of South Carolina followed a similar rationale in a decision in fall 2005.81
C. L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire and Marine Insurance Company
In L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire and Marine Insurance Company,82
the Supreme Court of South Carolina addressed the issue of whether damage caused by the faulty workmanship of the contractor, L-J, Inc., and its
83
subcontractors, on a road project is covered under L-J Inc.'s CGL policy.
79 Id. at 579 (recognizing burden of proof to demonstrate whether an exclusionary
clause of CGL applies is on insurer); see also Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kment, 658 N.W.2d
662, 667-668 (Neb. 2003) (discussing Nebraska standard that insurer has burden to prove
exclusionary clause applicable). The "your work," also known as "business risk" exclusions intent is to prevent liability policies from insuring an insured's own faulty workmanship; which is considered a normal inherent business risk. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 684
N.W.2d at 579 (reiterating general purpose of "your work" exclusion); see also American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 673 N.W.2d at 65 (noting "business risk" exclusion purpose is preventing CGL insurance from being protection from claims based on poor business operations); Knutson Const. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 396 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Minn.
1986) (stressing principle CGL insurer's limit their assumption of risk to that beyond insured's control); Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 796 (1979) (noting absence
of coverage for an accident of faulty workmanship, however, existence of coverage for
faulty workmanship which causes an accident). The reasoning for the "your work" exclusion is to discourage sloppy work by making contractors pay for the losses resulting from
their own defective work, and precludes liability insurance from turning into a performance
bond. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 684 N.W.2d at 579; see also Knutson Const. Co. 396 N.W.2d
at 233 (noting to impose risk on CGL insurer such that policy acts like a performance bond
would make cost of insurance prohibitive); Weedo, 405 A.2d 788, 791 (discussing contractor bears risk of his failure and resulting contractual liability as he controls quality of goods
and services provided). The court concluded that because the roof structures and building
experienced substantial damage, the "your work" exclusion was inapplicable. Auto-Owners
Ins. Co., 684 N.W.2d at 579-80; see also Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17 (summarizing holding that "your" work exclusion not applicable).
80 Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 684 N.W.2d at 580 (reversing judgment against Home Pride
and instructing district court to enter judgment in favor of Home Pride consistent with opinion).
81 Compare L-J, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 33, with Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 684 N.W.2d 571.
82 621 S.E.2d 33 (S.C. 2005).
83 Id. at 34 (noting coverage issues addressed was whether damages caused by faulty
workmanship of contractor). In August 2004, the Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the appeals court decision in favor of the construction company. L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire and Marine Ins. Co., No. 25854, 2004 S.C. LEXIS 190, *2 (S.C. 2004), substituted opinion at, opinion withdrawn by, 621 S.E.2d 33 (S.C. 2005). In September 2005, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina withdrew its prior opinion and substituted it with a new
opinion, still reversing the Court of Appeals decision. L-J, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 33, 34.
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A developer hired L-J, Inc., to perform site development work and to construct roads for a subdivision. 84 The developer later sued the contractor
when the road substantially deteriorated.85 The deterioration included "alligator cracking," a term used to describe the severe cracking in asphalt
that has the characteristics of alligator skin. 86 L-J, Inc. agreed to pay the
developer in settlement negotiations, and when L-J, Inc. sought indemnity
from its numerous
insurers, Bituminous, one of these insurers, refused to
87
them.
indemnify
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the court of appeals
was mistaken in finding that the deterioration of the road constituted an
"occurrence" under the CGL policy. 88 The South Carolina Supreme Court
reasoned that the negligent acts by the insured during the stages of design,
preparation and construction were examples of faulty workmanship that
caused damage to the road system alone, and therefore did not fall under
84 L-J, Inc., 621 S.E.2d at 34 (summarizing circumstances surrounding faulty work-

manship claim under contractors CGL policy).
85 Id. (explaining developers suit against contractor). Four years after completion of
the work, which was performed primarily by subcontractors, the road had deteriorated to
the extent that the developer sued the contractor for breach of contract, breach of warranty,
and negligence. Id.
86 Id. at 36 (describing deterioration of road system).
87 Id. at 34 (summarizing settlement details of underlying lawsuit). In settlement of
the lawsuit, the contractor agreed to pay the developer $750,000, and subsequently sought
indemnity from Bituminous as well as three other insurers that had issued CGL policies for
the particular project. Id. Only Bituminous refused to pay its portion of the indemnification. Id. The contractor and the three other insurers brought a declaratory judgment action
seeking Bituminious' contribution. Id. In determining Bituminious owed the other insurers a contribution, the Charleston Circuit Court special master concluded the damage to the
roadway system was covered under the CGL policy. Id. The court of appeals subsequently
affirmed the special master's decision that "the damage constituted an "occurrence," and the
"expected or intended" and "your work" exclusions did not apply to work performed by
subcontractors." Id. The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted certiorari and reversed
the court of appeals decision. Id. The court allowed a rehearing, withdrawing the prior
opinion, and again reversed the court of appeals decision. Id.
88 Id. at 34-35 (reversing court of appeals decision). Although numerous
other jurisdictions have decided the issue of "whether property damage to the work product alone,
caused by faulty workmanship, constitutes an occurrence," the issue of whether faulty
workmanship constitutes an occurrence was a matter of first impression for South Carolina.
Id. The majority of other jurisdictions have ruled that faulty workmanship by itself, resulting in damage to the work product alone, is not an "occurrence" under the CGL policy.
See, e.g., Amerisure, Inc. v. Wurster Constr. Co., Inc., 818 N.E.2d 998, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004) (finding faulty workmanship not an accident and therefore not an "occurrence");
Heile v. Herrmann, 736 N.E. 2d 566, 568 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (concluding faulty workmanship not an "occurrence" when damage is solely to work product). However, in prior
decisions, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has held that it is not the intent of the CGL
policy to cover economic loss that results from faulty workmanship. Century Indem. Co. v.
Golden Hills Builders, Inc., 561 S.E.2d 355, 359 (S.C. 2002) (noting insurer has no duty to
defend insured in situation where faulty workmanship by insured's subcontractor results in
losses).
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the CGL policy's definition of an "occurrence". 9 Reasoning there was not
any alleged property damage beyond the contractor's defective performance; the court concluded the CGL policy did not cover Bituminous' contract liability for a claim for money damages for compensation for this
substandard work. 90
The Supreme Court of South Carolina filed its opinion for L-J, Inc.
in August 2004; however, this opinion was subsequently withdrawn and
substituted with a second opinion, filed in September 2005. 9 1 In the first
opinion, the Supreme Court of South Carolina discussed the "subcontractor
exception" to the "your work" exclusion.92 Further, the court reversed the
court of appeals finding that an exception to an exclusion can restore coverage.93 Specifically, the court noted that "in stating that the exception to
the exclusion 'restores' coverage, the court of appeals overlooks existing
law, which states that 'an exclusion does not provide coverage but limits
coverage.' ' ,94 However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina's second
opinion, which replaced its first opinion, notably did not address these exclusions.9 5

89 L-J, Inc., 621 S.E.2d at 35 (holding damage to roadway system did not constitute

an occurrence). According to the deposition testimony, the several negligent acts by the
insured during the states of design, preparation and construction, which resulted in the
premature deterioration of the roads, were the only "occurrences;" however, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina held the damage to the road systems did not constitute an occurrence. Id. at 36. The L-J, Inc. court discussed the distinction between a faulty workmanship claim and a claim for work product damage resulting from third party negligence. Id.;
see also High Country Assocs. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 477 (N.H. 1994)
(distinguishing claim for faulty workmanship versus claim for damage to work product
caused by third parties negligence). Particularly, the liability policy may "provide coverage
in cases where faulty workmanship causes a third party bodily injury or damage to the other
property, not in cases where faulty workmanship damages the work product alone. L.J.,
Inc., 621 S.E.2d at 36 n.4.
90 L.J., Inc., 621 S.E.2d at 36 (concluding insurance policy does not cover liability for
claim of money damages for compensation for defective performance). The Supreme Court
of South Carolina stressed that the purpose of the CGL policy was not to guarantee the
contractors work, characteristic of a performance bond. Id. at 36-37. Rather, the purpose of
an insurance policy is to insure against accidents. 1d; see also State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.
v. Tillerson, 777 N.E.2d 986 (I11.App. Ct. 2001) (rationalizing courts would transform CGL
policies into performance bonds if they found policy covered faulty workmanship).
91 L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire and Marine Ins. Co., No. 25854, 2004 S.C. LEXIS 190
(S.C. 2004), substituted opinion at, opinion withdrawn by, 621 S.E.2d 33 (S.C. 2005) (explaining sequence of opinions).
92 L-J, Inc., 2004 S.C. LEXIS at *12-*13, substituted opinion at, opinion withdrawn
by, 621 S.E.2d 33 (S.C. 2005) (comparing Supreme Court of Carolina's new opinion with
withdrawn opinion).
93 Id. (reversing court of appeals' decision that an exception to an exclusion can restore coverage).
94 Id. (describing rationale of withdrawn opinions reversal of court of appeals determination that an exception to an exclusion can "restore" coverage).
9' See generally, L-J, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 33.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF RECENT STATE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
In CGL policy coverage disputes regarding construction defects, the
central issue normally involves whether an insured's faulty workmanship
constitutes an "occurrence.

96

The determination of whether the damage

was caused by an "occurrence," commonly defined as an "accident," is a
question courts have long wrestled with, and insurer and policyholder
counsel and courts have considerably varied.9 7 Given the differing rationales among courts, uncertainty exists surrounding 98the extent of construction defect coverage available under a CGL policy.
In construction defect coverage disputes such as those in American
Family, Auto-Owners, and L-J, Inc., courts generally do not provide coverage for damage as a result of the insured's own faulty workmanship under
the CGL policy. 99 Although the courts in these three cases eventually

reached the same conclusion as to whether the CGL policy covers damage
to an insured's work, the three courts differed in how they reached this
conclusion.' °° Particularly, the courts took one of two extremely different
approaches.' 0' In American Family, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin concluded that damage to the insured's own work qualified as an "occurrence," however, as a result of the "your work" exclusion, the damage was
excluded from coverage. 10 2 The Auto Owners and L-J, Inc. Courts concluded that damage to the insured's own work is excluded from coverage
96

See supra notes 50-95 and accompanying text (discussing three state supreme court

decisions involving whether an insured's faulty workmanship constitutes an "occurrence").
97 See supra notes 4-14 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional variation on
what constitutes an "occurrence"). What constitutes an "accident" has confused courts
since the 1800's. See Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing judge's historical struggle
with question of what constitutes an "accident"). The Auto-Owners court noted that a few
courts in the country have considered unintentional damage resulting from faulty workmanship constituted an accident; compared to a majority of courts that have concluded faulty
workmanship alone is not covered under the CGL policy, because an accident requires
fortuity. See Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17.
98 See supra notes 4-14 and accompanying text (discussing general uncertainty of
coverage surrounding faulty workmanship claims under CGL policy).
99 See supra notes 50-95 and accompanying text (summarizing facts and holdings of
three cases). The purpose of CGL coverage is "for tort liability for physical damages to
others and not for contractual liability for the insured for economic loss because the product
or completed work is not that for which the damages person bargained." Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products Liability and Completed Operations What Every Lawyer
Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REV. 415, 441 (1971).
100 See supra notes 50-95 and accompanying text (summarizing facts and holdings of
three cases).
101 See Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing three courts different reasoning in
reaching same conclusion); see supra notes 50-95 and accompanying text (summarizing
facts and holdings of three cases).
102 See Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing three courts different reasoning in
reaching same conclusion); see supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text (summarizing
facts and holding of American Family).
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from the beginning because it is not caused by an "occurrence.", 03 The°n
courts, therefore, did not need to address the "your work" exclusion.
Nonetheless, the court in Auto-Owners, and the first opinion of the L-J,
Inc. court which was subsequently withdrawn, considered the "your work"
exclusion. 01 5
The disparity in the courts' approaches involved particularly the
"subcontractor exception" to the "your work" exclusion. °6 The court in
American Family utilized the "subcontractor exception" to bring back coverage for otherwise excluded property damage under the "your work" exclusion. °7 If the Auto Owners and L-J, Inc. courts had been faced with the
facts of American Family, however, it is apparent that these two courts
would not have restored coverage through the "subcontractor exception."'0 8 The Auto-Owners court concluded the "subcontractor exception"
to the "your work" exclusion (Exclusion 1) cannot provide coverage,
unless "(1) [t]here is an initial grant of coverage and (2) exclusion "1" operates to preclude coverage."' 0 9 Therefore, if American Family were to be
decided under the rationale of the Auto-Owners and the L-J, Inc. courts, it
is likely that the court would conclude there was no coverage to restore by
the "subcontractor exception" because faulty workmanship to the insured's
own work is not a covered "occurrence" in the first place.10 If the American Family court had affirmed the appellate ruling concluding that a general contractor could not obtain liability coverage for a subcontractor's
103

See Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing three courts different reasoning in

reaching same conclusion); see supra notes 67-95 and accompanying text (summarizing
facts and holding of Auto-Owners and L-J, Inc.).
104 See Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing three courts different reasoning in
reaching same conclusion); see supra notes 67-95 and accompanying text (summarizing
facts and holding of Auto-Owners and L-J, Inc.).
105 See Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing three courts different reasoning in
reaching same conclusion); see supra notes 67-95 and accompanying text (summarizing
facts and holding of Auto-Owners and L-J, Inc.).
106 See Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing three courts different reasoning in
reaching same conclusion); see supra notes 50-95 and accompanying text (summarizing
facts and holding of three cases).
107 See Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17 (explaining American Family court recognized
coverage through the "subcontractor exception" to the "your work" exclusion); see supra
notes 51-66 and accompanying text (summarizing facts and holding of American Family).
The court in American Family concluded the "your work" exclusion does not apply if the
property damage is caused by the work of a subcontractor. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (summarizing American Family rule).
108 See Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing three courts differing reasoning in
reaching same conclusion); see supra notes 50-95 and accompanying text (summarizing
facts and holding of three cases).
1"9 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing applicable conditions precedent for subcontractor exception to "your work" exclusion).
'10 See Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing three courts different reasoning in
reaching same conclusion); see supra notes 50-95 and accompanying text (summarizing
facts and holding of three cases).
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faulty work, CGL policies arguably would have been rendered worthless in
Wisconsin.'
Although important policy reasons dictate that liability insurance
should not cover repair or replacement of a contractor's poorly constructed
product, the American Family ruling blurs the line between a CGL policy
and a performance bond by allowing coverage for construction defects
caused by the work of a subcontractor." 12 Allowing the CGL policy to
cover construction defects is a significant victory for both building contractors and subcontractors.'13 This ruling has widespread effects, particularly
to insurance companies which have a duty
to defend their insured's while
14
the question of coverage is investigated."
The Supreme Court of South Carolina's reversal of the appeals
court's decision in L-J, Inc. could potentially have widespread effects on
other courts and jurisdictions. 1 5 For example, Pennsylvania's Superior
Court recently relied on the South Carolina Court of Appeals decision in LJ, Inc.116 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted an appeal in this
particular case, which will further define the law of CGL coverage." 7 In
light of the conflicting case law and frequency of litigation in this area, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently certified three questions to the Texas Supreme Court, including whether construction defects
constitute an "occurrence" under a CGL policy.""
Given the difference in courts' rationales throughout the country, it
is time for the United States Supreme Court to consider this issue so that
l

See supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text (summarizing facts and holding of

American Family).
112See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text (discussing policy reasons and pur-

pose of CGL policy).
113 See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text (discussing defense and indemnification aspects of CGL policy).
14 See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text (discussing defense and indemnification aspects of CGL policy).
115 See Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing courts decision in L-J, Inc.).
116Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commer. Union Ins. Co., 825 A.2d
641 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), appeal granted by 848 A.2d 925 (Pa. 2004); see Maniloff, supra
note 2, at 17 (noting Kvaerner Metals court relied heavily on South Carolina's Court of
Appeals decision in L-J., Inc.).
117 See supra note 116 and accompanying text (noting Kvaerner Metals court reliance
on courts rationale in L-J., Inc.).
118 Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid Continent Cas. Co., 428 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2005). In
October 2005, the appeals court held that:
Given the frequency this issue is litigated and the copious amount of conflicting
caselaw on both sides regarding whether construction errors causing damage to
the subject of the contract constitute an 'occurrence' causing 'property damage'
under a CGL policy, we believe that this is an issue that the Texas Supreme Court
should consider resolving.
Id. at 199.
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contractors will be able to better understand what their CGL policy covers." 9 The Supreme Court should follow the decisions of many jurisdictions by holding that faulty workmanship, standing alone, does not constitute an "occurrence," and should clearly explain the proper rationale, hampering the blurred line between CGL policies and performance bonds.
Contractors should not be permitted to rely on a CGL policy to cover
faulty workmanship.
V. CONCLUSION
Considering the confusion in the courts and various jurisdictions,
contractors must naturally question the extent of coverage offered under
their CGL policy. 20 For example, the contractors involved in the "Big
Dig" likely regard their CGL coverage as vital liability protection. Not
surprisingly, many of these contractors would be shocked if they discovered they did not have coverage for faulty workmanship under their CGL
policy. Although some industry experts have suggested that a uniform
approach to construction defect coverage will never exist, considering the
dramatic consequences to the industry of the coverage, would it not be
better for the United
States Supreme Court to put an end to the fragmenta12'
authority?
of
tion

Lisa C. Friedlander

119 See supra notes 50-95 and accompanying text (discussing three recent state su-

preme court decisions varying rationales).
120 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (discussing shock of contractors upon
discovery of extent of coverage under CGL policy); Jeremy Harrell, Supreme Court Ruling
Hailed As Victory For Builders, THE DAILY REPORTER (MILWAUKEE, WI), Jan. 13, 2004,
available at LEXIS, Dolan Media Newswires (discussing American Family decision as
important legal victory for building contractors).
121 See Maniloff, supra note 2, at 17 (suggesting uniform approach to construction
defect coverage not possible). Similar to the fragmentation of authority regarding the pollution exclusion litigation, Randy Maniloff has suggested that a uniform approach to coverage
for construction defect litigation is also not foreseeable. Id.

